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ABSTRACT 
 
A striking feature of the latest version of Dennett’s ‘big picture’ of the evolution of life 
and mind is frequent reference to ‘affordances’. An affordance is, roughly, a possibility 
for action for a creature in an environment. Given more than one possibility for action, a 
good question is: what will the creature actually do? I argue that affordances pose a 
problem of selection, and that a good general solution to this problem of mind-design is 
to implement a system of preferences. 
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❧ 
 
 
Daniel Dennett’s new book, From Bacteria to Bach and Back [Dennett (2017)], which 
I’ll sometimes refer to simply as ‘BBB’, is one of his ‘big unified picture’ books, like 
Consciousness Explained [(1991)] or — even more so — like Darwin’s Dangerous 
Idea [(1995)]. While there are many new details and modifications in BBB, the broad 
outline is familiar because it is the view, or at least major parts of it, that he’s been 
defending for many years. Darwin and Turing are still central heroes, dualists and 
supernaturalists remain key targets of an ambitious and wide-ranging selectionist 
naturalism about life, mind and language.  
 
A key reason that this book exists then, is not so much that Dennett has a big new thing 
to say, but that he’s taken the lessons of many years of attempts at explanation and 
persuasion, with their attendant successes and failures, to work out substantially 
updated expositions of his views. He says as much in the opening pages. For the reader 
already acquainted with the earlier work, perhaps especially for the one in broad 
agreement (which includes me) the pleasure of this book is akin to that of reading a new 
translation of a familiar work, or seeing a fresh adaptation of a favourite play. 
 
BBB isn’t merely a retread, though: there are many changes of detail. Some are 
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subtractions. So there’s hardly any mention of ‘figment’ or the ‘library of Babel’, none 
of ‘universal acid’, the sphex wasp, or of Orwell and Stalin. There are also differences 
of emphasis, including an expanded and updated defense of the meme-concept, and an 
extended discussion of what is distinctive about encultured and tool-wielding human 
minds. A long familiar theme warning against supposing comprehension where 
uncomprehending competence is sufficient is forcefully emphasised. One change that I 
found especially striking is the inclusion and central use of a notion of ‘affordance’ in 
Dennett’s recent exposition. There’s no explicit mention of affordances, or of JJ Gibson 
who coined the term, either in Consciousness Explained, or in Darwin’s Dangerous 
Idea. Most of what I have to say here will focus on the place of affordances in Dennett’s 
argument. Affordances are generally understood as a kind of possibility for an organism 
(given its needs and capacities) in a specific environment. They’re often, but not 
always, possibilities for some kind of activity or behaviour, and a common homely 
example is that a chair affords sitting for a person of the right size. 
 
In what follows I spend a little time getting clearer on what affordances are supposed to 
be, especially for Dennett. Then I argue that thinking about cognition in terms of 
affordances requires facing up to the problem of selection, whether between 
simultaneous and incompatible ‘active’ affordances, or of how much and when to to 
perform the behaviour associated with a single one, or several that aren’t mutually 
exclusive. I go on to suggest that a system of preferences (sub-personal representations 
of value) is a good general design response to the selection problem, and that 
preferences can, furthermore, be a satisfying example of competence without 
comprehension. I regard the view I’ll suggest about preferences as Dennettian, and it 
draws direct inspiration from some of his earlier work. Indeed, I struggle to see how the 
notion of affordances can do the required explanatory work without something like 
preferences, so I think it is worth making the reasons for this explicit. 
 
1. Affordances 
 
The English verb ‘afford’ has two related primary meanings. In one, to ‘afford’ 
something is to have the means for it, most commonly with reference to a budget of 
Working Draft Version 
 3 
money or time. (For example ‘I can’t afford to sit and chat, I have a train to catch’.) In 
the other, to ‘afford’ something is to provide or supply it. (As in, ‘This ledge affords a 
view of the whole valley’.) JJ Gibson mostly used the latter sense, and also coined the 
noun ‘affordance’ to refer to the provision of some possibility to a creature given its 
capabilities and priorities [Gibson (1979)]. Since Gibson introduced the term, it has 
been an important concept in ecological psychology, and enjoyed significant attention 
in discussions of distributed, situated or embodied cognition [e.g. Clark (1997)], as well 
as by enactivists [e.g. Chemero (2009)]. Although the term has been in use for around 
four decades, there’s been a striking recent rise in activity, and it has featured in several 
high profile synoptic works on cognition, including Andy Clark’s Surfing Uncertainty 
[(2016)], Ruth Millikan’s Beyond Concepts [(2017)] and Daniel Dennett’s From 
Bacteria to Bach and Back [(2017)]. It has also gained modest currency in parts of 
cognitive neuroscience [e.g. Cisek (2007)]. None of these works is ‘strictly’ Gibsonian, 
and all put the notion of an affordance to work in distinctive or qualified ways. A little 
orientation will help focus on what Dennett specifically is up to. 
 
Gibson’s notion of an affordance can be given engagingly simple glosses, such as that 
the “affordances of the environment are what it offers animals, what it provides or 
furnishes, for good or ill” [Gibson (1979, p127)]. But these need to be hedged or 
qualified, to guard against tempting interpretations that Gibson was keen to reject. 
Gibson was a kind of direct realist about perception, and his general psychological 
views were in some respects anti-behaviourist and (later) anti-cognitivist, especially in 
rejecting representational conceptions of cognition. So, for example, he took pains to 
reject the view that affordances were stimuli [e.g. (1979), p140]. An affordance isn’t 
just a property of the environment, nor is it just a psychological (or psycho-mechanical) 
property of an organism. As Gibson puts it, an affordance “is neither an objective 
property nor a subjective property; or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across 
the dichotomy of subjective–objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is 
equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior” [Gibson (1979), p129]. 
 
Gibson counted a very wide range of relations and possibilities as instances of 
affordances, including the ground affording standing, the air affording breathing, 
surfaces affording falling off, other organisms affording being eaten, as well as 
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affordances of social life and tool use. Not all affordances are positive or beneficial, and 
it is part of Gibson’s own view that the value of an affordance is directly perceived 
[Gibson (1979), p137]. As Gibson speaks of them, affordances are things a creature 
might do and also things that might happen to it (in a particular environment, given its 
body) that it in some sense appreciates. These can be good, like breathing and mating, 
or bad, like falling down or being eaten, and the valence is part of what is perceived. 
 
The recent appropriations of affordance-talk that I’m interested in here, especially by 
Clark and Dennett, acknowledge Gibson but are careful to signal that they’re not ‘strict’ 
Gibsonians. Both Clark and Dennett are kinds of cognitivist, even though neither is 
friendly to the sorts of ‘Classical Sandwich’ conceptions of cognition rejected by 
Gibson. Dennett has, furthermore, long-standing if qualified sympathies with 
behaviourism. In his earlier Being There, Clark credits Gibsonian affordances as being a 
‘direct inspiration’ for his notion of an ‘action-oriented representation’ [Clark (1997), 
p172]. That type of representation, recall, is not a passive world-model requiring 
interpretation in advance of action-specification. Rather, it is a structure including both 
aspects of the transduced environment and possible actions in a form that makes the 
representation itself fit to serve as a controller [Clark (1997), pp47-51]. His current 
contention is that prediction-driven learning is well-suited to giving “a grip” on 
affordances, still understood as organism-relevant “opportunities for action and 
intervention” [Clark (1997), p171, xv]. Clark, unlike Dennett, also refers to the work of 
Paul Cisek, who has offered a view of the neural implementation of action selection 
called the ‘affordance competition hypothesis’ [Cisek (2012)]. 
 
Dennett’s deployment of the notion of affordances is unsurprisingly, given their 
common ground, not far from Clark’s. Both embrace the one key Gibsonian 
committment that affordances are sensory-motor relations, specific to combinations of 
environments and particular organisms, while avoiding the direct realism and anti-
representationalism. Where Clark notes Gibson as an inspiration for his notion of an 
‘action-centric representation’, Dennett says that his own related notion of “useful 
information” has Gibsonian antecedents [Dennett (2017, p180)]. For his part Dennett 
glosses affordances as “the relevant opportunities in the environment of any organism: 
things to eat or mate with, openings to walk through or look out of, holes to hide in, 
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things to stand on, and so forth” [Dennett (2017, p126)]. And tracking affordances, 
understood as organism-specific relations to useful information both positive and 
negative, is a key function, perhaps the key function, of brains: “Brains are control 
centers for dealing swiftly and appropriately with the opportunities and risks—the 
affordances—of a mobile life” [Dennett (2017, p227)]. Dennett, like Gibson, 
contemplates a wide-ranging and inclusive notion of affordances, even including 
affordances associated with appreciating jazz improvisation. 
 
In Clark and Dennett the accounts and glosses of affordances focus largely on 
affordances as provision or possibility. That’s well and good if you’re mostly trying to 
explain what an affordance is, and how to do without the notion of a brute environment 
that organisms cope with by making passive models that then stand in need of further 
interpretation before they can make any contribution to action selection or execution. 
But that can’t be the full story about affordances and the evolution of minds, because of 
what I’ll call the problem of affordance selection. 
 
2. Scarce means with alternative uses 
 
Affordance-talk is, as we’ve seen, almost always about possibility. Gibson spoke of 
affordances as what the environment ‘offered’ leaving open what, if anything, was 
‘taken’ by the organism. Clark and Dennett alike refer to them in terms of ‘possibilities’ 
and ‘opportunities’. An obvious question, then, is given one or more affordances, what 
will the creature actually do? I’ll call this the problem of affordance selection. 
 
To begin thinking about this, suppose there’s only one affordance. This might be 
because the creature only has one relevant capacity or behaviour, or because the world 
is so disposed as to provide only one affordance to that creature at some time. Even in 
this minimal case, there’s a question about whether the behaviour will be produced, and 
if it is, when it will, how intensely, and for how much of the time that the affordance is 
‘active’. (To the experienced lab pigeon, a key affords pecking, but rewarded keys don’t 
generally get pecked continually.) Even in the single-affordance case, it is clear enough 
that the questions about what will be done, when, and how much, are partly economic. 
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Producing behaviour usually draws on (even if its consequences might also replenish) a 
finite budget of energy, water or something else, and use up all-too-finite time. It won’t 
always be the case that an animal can afford to produce the behaviour that is afforded. 
 
The questions become more interesting if we consider cases — arguably more common 
for most creatures most of the time — where multiple affordances are in play. While 
some combinations of behaviours can be produced together (like walking and chewing 
gum)1 the economic dimension is most striking for mutually exclusive behaviours (like 
fighting and fleeing). The mutual exclusivity of two behaviours might arise in more 
than one way, including because different occurrent features of the world 
simultaneously afford mutually exclusive activities, or because one or more of them 
affords multiple candidate activities that are mutually exclusive. The hungry and thirsty 
creature that detects food to one side of its head and water to the other one is subject to 
two simultaneously incompatible affordances (if it has only one mouth). So too is the 
thirsty, drinking creature that detects a predator, and can either continue drinking or 
flee. What makes behaviours mutually exclusive in any given case could be a fact about 
the structure of the environment or of the creature’s body, or a mixture. (The factors can 
also change. Standing in a queue and sending an email used to be mutually exclusive.) 
An important source of these constraints for some behaviours is the specific 
interdependencies and relations between the various degrees of freedom in an 
organism’s own (extended) body. Carrying something in your mouth rules out making 
some vocalizations. Running at full speed requires co-ordination of both arms and legs, 
etc. None of this is controversial or novel, but it is worth emphasising that the mutual 
exclusivity of affordances — which just are possibilities for action given properties of 
both environment and organism — is partly contingent of the structure of the capacities 
of the organism and the structure of the environment.  
 
One generic way that a creature can be more effective is by more often doing ‘better’ at 
producing appropriate behaviour given multiple affordances. (That is, of course, 
ultimately better in currency recognised in the game of life. I will take this as given.) 
                                                            
1  Systematic students of behaviour who find mutually exclusive behaviours useful can 
handle this with book-keeping, counting ‘walking and not chewing’, ‘not walking and 
chewing’ and ‘walking and chewing’ as three distinct behaviours. 
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Creatures that tend to favour drinking over eating when more dehydrated, or fleeing at 
the expense of water when predators are dangerously close, for example, can be 
expected to do better than ones that make less advantageous selections. The problem 
here is economic in a quite strict way - it concerns the allocation of scarce means 
(energy, time, bodily degrees of freedom) with alternative uses. And the allocations 
don’t only have varying costs, they have varying returns (in rehydration, nutrition, 
staying alive, copulating, etc.). Selection between affordances that is sensitive to the 
costs and returns is selection that tracks what the creature can afford.  
 
Gibson, while more interested in perception than explaining cognition or behaviour, has 
a key part of the answer to the problem of selection, because of his view, noted above, 
that the value of an affordance, whether positive or negative, is itself directly perceived. 
(I say ‘part’ of an answer, because we’d still need to say something about what gets 
done with the appreciated values, including how exploitation and exploration are 
traded-off where that is a factor.) Dennett, as we’ve seen, does say that affordances can 
be positive or negative. But he doesn’t say explicitly that this fact about them is a 
component or aspect of the affordance considered as a cognitive process in the 
organism. For this reason the picture we are given in BBB is a little cryptic about the 
problem of affordance selection. 
 
That said, few philosophers have taken selection as consistently seriously as Dennett, 
who as I noted in opening has long argued that Darwinian processes of trial and error, 
variation and selection, at different scales (including time-scales) and in varying 
organisational hierarchies have extraordinary explanatory range. These processes 
include ‘vanilla’ selection on Darwinian agents whose behavioural dispositions are 
fixed by between-generation selection, and the ‘post-natal design-fixing’ by which 
Skinnerian agents tune their dispositions in light of a history of reinforcement, as well 
as the planning and selection processes in more sophisticated agents capable of various 
forms of ‘off-line’ learning, and exploitation of (and also by!) culturally transmitted 
replicators. 
 
The distinction between Darwinian and Skinnerian agents goes back to his essay “Why 
the Law of Affect Will not Go Away” [Dennett (1975)] which I was recently very 
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pleased to find Peter Godfrey-Smith counted among his ‘favourite’ papers by Dennett 
[Godfrey-Smith (2018)]. That distinction was elaborated in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea 
[(1995)] and Kinds of Minds [(1996)] into what Dennett called the ‘Tower of Generate 
and Test’, and Godfrey-Smith goes on to argue, drawing on unpublished work by 
Russell Gray and Alex Taylor, in favour of a richer classification, arranged in a tree 
rather than a tower. There’s much of value and interest in his proposal, as well as 
Dennett’s reply [Dennett (2018)] but when I return to this topic towards the end of (§3) 
I’m going to focus on Darwinian and Skinnerian agents as Dennett describes them. 
 
Both types (unless their capacities are hugely limited or their worlds uncommonly 
simple) face the problem of selection — between afforded behaviours — that I 
described above. I want to sketch a view, inspired by the earlier work I’ve just drawn 
attention to, that I hope Dennett would find agreeable, and then briefly relate it to a 
concern that is in the foreground right through BBB, that we don’t suppose 
comprehension where competence will do. The key idea is that what I’ll call 
‘preferences’, understood as cognitive states valuing possible behaviours,2 or 
representing them as better or worse, can be an elegant solution to the problem of 
affordance selection.  
 
3. Affording Preferences  
 
Giant sea slugs (Pleurobranchaea) are carnivorous and will generally eat any animal 
matter they encounter, “including other sea-slugs and their eggs” [Manning and 
Dawkins (1998, p. 226)]. An important exception to this indiscriminate behaviour is 
that they do not eat their own eggs during egg laying. This restraint is clearly adaptive: 
the genes of creatures that routinely consume their own descendants will tend to be 
poorly represented in subsequent generations compared to ones that don’t. The 
mechanism stopping sea slugs from eating their own eggs, though, is a quite simple and 
direct inhibition. It operates without representations of the disutility of infanticide: 
during egg-laying their bodies release a hormone that inhibits movement of the mouth 
                                                            
2  We could also think of preferences as representing the values of outcomes or states of 
affairs. Since we’re talking about affordances here, I’m mostly going to consider 
preferences as indexed to behaviours given current state (of world and body). 
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[Davis et al (1977)]. They don’t eat at all, that is, while laying eggs. But there’s no 
sense in which the return on eating their own eggs is represented as negative. Rather the 
affordance of the eggs right under them is simply turned off, by an inhibitory link 
strongly reminiscent of the representation-free ‘subsumption’ relationships once 
championed by Rodney Brooks [e.g. (1991)].3 
 
The organism that solves behaviour allocation problems by methods such as these is 
prone to ‘leaving money on the table’, as they say to refer to a deal that doesn’t extract 
some of the available returns. In this case, for example, the sea slug that happens to lay 
eggs while close to something nutritious that isn’t its own eggs misses that tasty morsel 
and the calories it could have accumulated. Many creatures can, furthermore, 
demonstrably do better. In a series of important experiments Peter Shizgal and Kent 
Conover offered rat subjects mutually exclusive choices between trains of brain 
stimulation reward (BSR) pulses of varying lengths and infusions of sugar solution of 
varying sizes, as well as choices where one option returned a bundle reward including 
both BSR and sugar solution. They found that the observed choices, including cases 
where one option was a bundle, were sensitive to opportunity cost (from the forgone 
lever), which is to say that the rats were capable of trading off the varying multi-modal 
returns quite finely and switching lever accordingly. As they reasoned: 
 
“In natural settings, the goals competing for behavior are complex, 
multidimensional objects and outcomes. Yet, for orderly choice to be possible, 
the utility of all competing resources must be represented on a single, common 
dimension.” [Shizgal & Conover (1996)] 
 
What Shizgal and Conover mean by ‘orderly choice’ is simply choice that efficiently 
trades off costs and gains for rewards and punishments that differ in both magnitude and 
type. Orderly choice, that is, is efficiently solving the affordance-selection problem, if 
we regard the presented levers before the familiarised rat as affording pressing. I’m 
using the term ‘preferences’ to refer to the representations of utility that they have in 
                                                            
3  Some sea slugs are capable of some kinds of learning, so it’s important not to think that 
all of their behavior selection processes are like the one described. See Perry, Barron & 
Cheng [(2013)] for a survey of learning types among invertebrates. 
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mind. A preference is a real cognitive state, that somehow represents, encodes or tracks 
the (expected) value of local world-states or outcomes that an agent can detect or 
anticipate, or actions that it can perform. Preferences are, more or less, utilities. 
 
Shizgal and Conover say that the value of competing resources “must” be represented 
on a single scale, suggesting that abstract utility representations are the only way to 
accomplish efficient allocations. Whether or not that is the case isn’t my concern here.4 
For current purposes a weaker claim, that relatively abstract value-tracking — by means 
of preferences — can enable efficient selections, is sufficient. Before saying more 
directly about preferences, though, I need to spend a little time talking about final 
common paths.   
 
Sherrington [(1906)] is generally recognised as among the first to articulate the key 
ideas here, independently of the topic of preferences. Consider a complex bit of animal 
anatomy with multiple degrees of freedom such as a primate forelimb with shoulder, 
elbow and a set of digits. Some combinations of allocations of the effectors, such as 
simultaneously flexing and relaxing the same muscle, or flexing those that would move 
a segment in one direction around a joint while not relaxing those that would move it in 
the opposite direction, are at least incompatible and could even be harmful. Sherrington 
argued that upstream of the specific effectors (in what he called the ‘afferent arc’) 
competing allocations (‘reflexes’) converged in a ‘final common path’, where only one 
reflex (as opposed to some combination or sum) would gain control of the effectors 
downstream [e.g. Sherrington (1906, pp. 117-118)]. 
 
The scope of the ‘common’ part of the expression ‘final common path’ depends on how 
many effectors or degrees of freedom have possibly incompatible uses given the 
candidate actions. This can easily be quite large, since some actions, such as reaching 
and grasping, require that multiple degrees of freedom be more or less simultaneously 
co-ordinated, as well as having others ‘co-operate’ by not interfering. (The grasping 
elements of a movement to pick a ripe piece of fruit won’t succeed if the rest of the arm 
is co-opted for ‘waving hello’, or if the legs move the whole body away.) A final 
                                                            
4  For more on common currency claims in the cognitive and behavioural sciences see 
Spurrett [(2014)]. 
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common path is the form of a possible solution to these more general control problems 
too. It is a functional region of a control system in which events that prevent 
incompatible allocations of degrees of freedom, and which co-ordinate multiple degrees 
of freedom, can occur. While this line of reasoning could be stated and developed in a 
relatively abstract and anatomy-independent way, the historical version arose in the 
course of enquiry into the functions of specific parts of the spinal nerves and primary 
motor cortex. 
 
We should be very wary of taking this reasoning to establish the need for strict and total 
final common paths in organisms with complex bodies. That would be like supposing a 
determinate ‘finish line’ for the control of a system spread out in space. The same 
considerations that weigh against assuming such a finish line for consciousness 
(Dennett [1991]) apply by analogy here. There will have to be some blurring and 
smearing of boundaries, and indeterminacy in some temporal ordering relations. That 
said, there are undoubtedly local neural final common paths, such as systems for 
controlling saccadic eye movements in creatures capable of them (Glimcher [2003]). 
There are also distributed and hierarchically organised approximate ones in the 
somatotopic neural maps found in many real brains.  
 
Final common paths enable, it is worth noting, an exemplary kind of competence 
without comprehension. Whether innate or acquired from experience, the fluent co-
ordination of degrees of freedom to produce behaviours out of complex bodies, with 
only the rarest attempts at structurally conflicted activity — at least in experienced 
creatures — is remarkable. While it may be tempting to suppose that this depends on 
knowledgeable planning, the mundane truth is that brains and peripheral nervous 
systems are typically set up so that many inappropriate allocations are simply ruled out. 
In addition, and of special interest for my purposes here, final common paths provide a 
natural architectural or functional ‘place’ for the operation of preferences. If there’s 
somewhere that mechanically incompatible actions are filtered out, then that somewhere 
might allow competition between options that are not ruled out to be expressed. 
 
Some key early experiments in neuroeconomics depended on this very line of thinking 
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(1999), Dorris & Glimcher (2004)]. In them monkey subjects were trained to express 
choices by making saccades to different targets. Saccades are a convenient behaviour 
precisely because they are controlled by small networks of muscles with their own 
series of neural topographic maps, corresponding to a two-dimensional ‘dart board’ of 
possible fixation targets relative to the skull. These maps are, in part, a final common 
path that generally prevents the eyes from attempting conflicted movements like 
simultaneously turning up and down. They’re also a kind of bottleneck for competition 
between fixation targets. (Do I continue looking at my conversational partner, or do I 
glance at the television screen off to one side?) It turns out that in the interval leading 
up to choice, the levels of activity in regions of the topographic maps corresponding to 
the saccadic targets under study varied with the expected return on that movement. Platt 
and Glimcher’s monkeys were ‘paid’ in juice, while Dorris and Glimcher’s subjects 
played an inspection game with returns in water. In later work Klein, Deaner and Platt 
[(2008)] found that single-unit activity in neurons specialised for saccades consistently 
reflected values of both social and fluid rewards, so this isn’t just something about fluid 
rewards. 
 
This isn’t, furthermore, just a discovery about monkeys, and it isn’t just a discovery 
about saccadic movements. In neuroeonomic study of human choices, correlates of 
utility are usually sought further ‘upstream’ of anatomically detailed final common 
paths, because electrode recordings are rarely used in human neuroeconomic 
experiments, and choices expressed by button presses and the like don’t correspond to 
somatotopic maps that are as conveniently tractable as those for eye movements 
[Glimcher (2011, Chapter 7)]. Even so, the evidence is rather compelling. Levy and 
Glimcher [(2012)] survey relevant experimental work up to 2012. First they detail 
studies showing that activity in the ventral striatum was positively associated with, 
among other things, monetary gains and losses, cumulative monetary rewards, 
anticipation of varying monetary rewards, expected values of uncertain monetary 
rewards, and discounted value of delayed monetary rewards. Second, they consider 
studies with at least one incentive other than money, including consumer goods, 
gustatory rewards (water, juice, food), physical pain, social reputation, again finding 
consistent correlations. Whether or not Shizgal and Conover were correct to say that 
orderly choice means that there “must” be value representations in a common scale, the 
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work of some neuroeconomists suggests that there is in fact one for a wide range of 
choice types. There is far less comparative neuroeconomics than I for one would like to 
read, but approximately analogous results have been found in other vertebrates and 
some invertebrates with indications that the neural systems across taxa share structural 
similarities, and similar functional roles for dopamine or related molecules. (This 
suggests that preference sensitivity, where it occurs, is an elaboration of older systems 
modulating motor control, rather than that everything that can move has preferences.) 
 
I mentioned Paul Cisek in (§1) above. His ‘affordance competition hypothesis’ [Cisek 
(2007)] is in the end a neuroscientist’s proposal for a way to make sense of the sort of 
neuroeconomic data I’ve described a fraction of, and other findings, without supposing 
some kind of ‘Classical Sandwich’ model of cognition. Cisek proposes, instead, that 
“the processes of action selection and specification occur simultaneously” [(2007, 
p1586)] and argues that incoming sensory information selectively informs the 
generation of a number of incompletely specified behaviours, which may be released 
into execution prior to full specification. (That is, some of the specification would be 
handled after the behaviour was ‘launched’.) Reading his account of parallel, 
incomplete, competing behaviour specification processes with Dennett in mind, it is 
very tempting to call it a ‘multiple drafts’ model of affordance competition: “From this 
perspective, behaviour is viewed as a constant competition between internal 
representations of the potential actions which Gibson (1979) termed ‘affordances’.” 
[Cisek (2007, p1586)] Cisek gets to affordances starting with neuroeconomic findings 
in clear view, and looking for a way of making sense of the brain without Classical 
Sandwiches. If we start with affordances, and face up to the problem of allocation, I 
think we should end up in approximately the same place as Cisek does. That is, I think 
that the argument of Dennett’s BBB requires that something like preferences be at work 
in many motile organisms. 
 
Let us return to Dennett’s Tower of Generate and Test. It seems clear enough that what 
he calls Skinnerian agents have to have preferences. Recall that, unlike Darwinian 
agents all of whose design precedes the life of the agent, the more sophisticated 
Skinnerian agents undergo some ‘post-natal design-fixing’ in light of a history of 
reinforcement. In them, an additional form of selection is at work, based on assessment 
Working Draft Version 
 14 
of the consequences of their own behaviours. This selection requires an evaluation of 
the state that the agent is in, perhaps indexed to a recent salient behaviour of its own, to 
say whether that state is better or worse than some reference state. The reference state 
might be an ‘expected’ reward, and the comparison with the actual reward provide the 
basis for tuning the behavioural dispositions. It makes no difference to this if, in line 
with the way things are put in BBB we understand Skinnerian agents as affordance-
tracking, and affordance-learning, machines. (Although an orthodox Gibsonian might 
be aghast at talk of Skinnerian affordance tracking.) ‘Expected’ here doesn’t, of course, 
mean a whole agent state of aware anticipation, merely some kind of sub-personal 
tracking. As Dennett says, the Skinnerian agent “doesn’t have to understand why it now 
prefers these tried-and-true behaviors when it does; it is the beneficiary of this simple 
design-improvement ratchet, its own portable Darwinian selection process” [Dennett 
(2017, p155)]. Preferences, that is, can also deliver competence without comprehension: 
they’re represented, but not represented ‘to’ or ‘for’ the agent as a whole, merely 
serving traffic between the disposition-tuning systems. If we understand Skinnerian 
agents as in the affordance-tracking business, though, we’re committed to thinking of 
the affordances as being somehow evaluated. 
 
It’s an interesting question whether Darwinian agents could occur with preferences. The 
fact that they don’t learn doesn’t by itself settle this question, because a Darwinian 
agent with anything but a trivially tiny behavioural repertoire or unusually simple 
environment has the problem of affordance selection, and the costs of and returns on its 
behaviours can be multi-modal and varied. Preferences that were not used to drive post-
natal design fixing could still contribute to making the outcome affordance competition 
more advantageous in such agents, although I just don’t know if any real natural agents 
have this property. Reinforcement learning by ‘evolutionary methods’ searches the 
space of ‘policies’, which map states to actions, without the agents doing any learning 
themselves. Some ways of encoding policies could involve preferences, although in 
artificial systems policies can also be things like lookup tables. Perhaps Darwinian 
agents with proto-preferences account for some of the routes in design space that lead to 
Skinnerian agents. The indications that reward systems are elaborations of older motor 
control modulation systems encourage this view.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
I like to think that the picture I’ve sketched here is at least consistent with the much 
larger view of the evolution of life and mind laid out in BBB. As I hope I’ve made clear, 
the considerations that I’ve emphasised are directly inspired both by Dennett’s own 
deep and wide-ranging interest in the importance of selection, and by specific 
arguments and thinking tools found in his own earlier work, perhaps especially 
including the ‘Tower of Generate and Test’, parts of which are incorporated into BBB. It 
at least isn’t obvious that Dennett sees things this way, because outside the brief 
discussion of Skinnerian agents (which isn’t framed in terms of affordances) his own 
discussion of affordances says relatively little about the problem of affordance 
selection, and the book as a whole barely mentions preferences (in the relevant sense) or 
cognate notions like utility. 
 
I’ve sketched arguments that there is a problem of affordance selection, and that 
preferences are one way of solving that problem, which seems to have been taken — to 
varying extents — in many natural motile organisms. I think that naturalists who find 
affordance talk useful should both accept that there is a selection problem, and that 
preferences can help deal with it, despite the fact that in many cases people who talk 
about affordances do so without explicit acknowledgment of the problem of selection, 
or of preferences. As I noted early on, the word ‘afford’ can refer both to something 
provided or supplied, and to whether or not the means for some purpose are available. 
Selection is important partly in proportion to the severity of scarcity. Sensitivity to 
scarcity is, correspondingly, a potentially useful thing to have.5 So preferences can help 
an agent tell which affordances it can afford. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
5  A point I don’t have space to develop here is that scarcity will mean that not all 
affordances will be discriminated or processed in any detail, and that which ones are 
could itself be subject to competition and sensitive to needs and priorities. Cisek [(2007)] 
is alert to this, as is Millikan [(2017)]. 
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